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Energy storage has been identified as a priority technology for innovation. However, the rapidly 
developing family of storage technologies will find it difficult, under the current regulatory regimes, 
to compete with conventional generators for the provision of electricity system services, and this is 
likely to impede innovation. This paper analyses and categorizes 16 investment barriers hindering 
the near-term deployment of energy storage technologies in electricity markets, which are related 
to four regulatory and public attitudes barriers. 
The most important regulatory barrier is the current classification of storage as a generation asset, 
despite it being unable to provide a positive net flow of electricity, which is used to justify double 
network usage charges. The merit order design of balancing and ancillary markets makes it difficult 
for storage technologies to recoup their relatively high capital cost, while capacity markets penalize 
their limited discharge duration. Network companies are in the best position to realize the system 
value of storage, but their ownership may only be acceptable if system operation is made 
independent of network operation. 
Current initiatives to address these issues include flexible connection agreements and the 
development of enhanced frequency response and aggregate fast reserve services. However, to 
remove the identified barriers, a market structure that valued the flexibility offered by storage, 
viewing it as complementing rather than competing with network and generation assets, would be 
required. 
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Highlights 
1. Innovation in new technologies is underpinned by learning through deployment. 
2. We review market barriers to deploying energy storage technologies. 
3. Four 'exogenous' barriers underpin 16 more general barriers to deployment. 
4. The definition of storage as generation is the most important barrier. 
5. Several countries are promoting initiatives to encourage storage deployment. 
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1 Introduction 
The term ‘electrical energy storage’ encompasses a substantial number of diverse technologies 
whose aim is to store energy, then to release it later in the form of electricity. Most energy storage 
capacity worldwide is currently comprised of pumped hydropower plants that, due to their 
economies of scale and large-scale generation capabilities, have traditionally provided a number of 
system balancing services. 
Historically, energy storage in the electricity system has primarily focused on precursors to 
electricity (e.g. coal; natural gas), with flexible generation capacity being used to meet demand 
peaks. As weather-dependent renewables and inflexible nuclear power plants take a greater share 
of the electricity generation markets in the future, frequent excess supply peaks at times of low 
demand could occur. Electrical energy storage technologies can store this excess energy and use 
it to meet demand peaks, providing stability and increasing the robustness of low-carbon electricity 
systems [1]. Storage is unique because it decouples the generation of electricity from its 
consumption and, in so doing, can help to manage the grid better, optimize the use of current 
resources, and integrate large-scale renewables. 
This potential role for energy storage has led to it being identified as a key technology for the future 
[2]. For example, the UK Government has identified energy storage as one of ‘Eight Great 
Technologies’ for the UK [3] and has committed to a program of research and innovation [4]. Yet 
successful innovation that reduces technology costs requires the deployment of technologies to 
underpin learning-by-doing [5]. If this innovation drive is to be successful, energy storage will have 
to be able to compete with other generation in electricity markets. 
Energy storage competes with other generation to sell electricity in markets [6]. A combination of 
high capital costs and regulatory barriers mean that energy storage is uncompetitive in most 
markets at present. In several countries, governments are considering options to increase energy 
storage deployment through regulatory changes [e.g. 7, 8]. 
This paper identifies and categorizes the barriers to energy storage in existing electricity markets 
and considers how these could be addressed to encourage an appropriate level of technology 
innovation. We study the regulatory definition of energy storage, network barriers, issues related to 
the ownership and operation of storage by network operators, as well as balancing, ancillary, and 
capacity market design issues. 
1.1 Electricity markets 
Until the 1990s, most electricity companies were state-owned and prices were heavily regulated. 
Since liberalization in most OECD countries, most high-volume consumers have bought electricity 
through bilateral contracts [9], while other generation has been controlled though a series of 
markets. The complex price behavior in these markets has reflected the historically-high cost of 
both storage and spare generation capacity, high demand fluctuations, and a political need for the 
system to supply all demands at all times with high reliability. 
An important large-scale market for electrical energy storage technologies in the long term is the 
balancing market, where investments would be monetized through reserve replacement. Yet 
energy storage could also offer services in other ancillary markets for fast reserve and grid stability 
services [10], where they might be more competitive in the near term. These markets are listed for 
the UK in Table 1.  Providing multiple and simultaneous services to several markets could greatly 
increase revenues and underpin business cases [11], but is difficult to achieve due to operational 
practicalities. It is also possible that storage may play an important role in the energy wholesale 
market too, in the longer term, and aggregators are expected to help integrate smaller-scale 
technologies. 
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Service 
Response 
duration 
Timescale Role of storage 
RoCoF control < 0.5 sec < 15 min Charging or discharging in response to frequency deviations 
Frequency 
containment 
< 10 sec 10–30 sec 
(Dis)charging in response to loss of generation or load that affects the system 
frequency 
Frequency 
replacement 
< 2 min < 30 min 
(Dis)charging in response to loss of generation or load, with the aim of red that 
affects the system frequency 
Voltage support < 1 sec 1–60 sec 
(Dis)charging reactive power to stabilize voltage in the transmission and/or 
distribution system 
Operating reserve 240 min 2–24 hour Discharging at times of high demand in preference to flexible generation 
Black start N/A N/A Contributing to restarting an electricity system following a total failure 
Table 1. Services that energy storage could provide to the UK electricity system in the current market structure. RoCoF is the Rate of 
Change of Frequency. 
More widely, energy storage technologies could contribute across the electricity system, including 
to generation (balancing; reserve power), transmission (frequency control; investment deferral), 
distribution (voltage control; capacity support), and end users (peak-shaving; cost reduction and 
management) [12]. 
Changes to electricity markets to encourage energy storage would have two broad aims: (i) to 
encourage innovation to reduce prices, in the short term; and, (ii) to aim for the optimum 
deployment that reflects the increasing value of energy storage to the system, in the long term. The 
likely value of storage in the wider energy system in the future is not well understood. Moreover, 
the potential role and competitiveness of energy storage in new markets is also not well 
understood, partly because the temporal resolution of existing market models is inadequate to 
understand the multiple benefits that storage might offer to underpin the business cases for new 
deployments [13]. 
1.2 Energy storage technologies 
At present, pumped-hydro storage represents 99% of total storage power capacity worldwide, but 
has only a small role in most systems. For example, the UK has 80 GW generation capacity but 
only 3 GW storage capacity [14]. A range of alternative energy storage family of technologies have 
been developed that have a wide range of physical characteristics [15]. They are at very different 
levels of maturity, with only a few approaching commercialization. The wide diversity of energy 
storage technologies creates a challenge for regulators to design market structures and price 
signals that encourage appropriate levels of innovation across technologies and capture the 
diversity of the benefits that they can provide to the wider system. 
Energy storage technologies can be characterized by power rating and discharge duration, as 
shown in Figure 1. Technologies with long discharge duration and high power rating, such as 
pumped-hydro storage, are able to provide services such as balancing to the transmission system 
operator (TSO) and energy management. Those with shorter discharge duration and lower power 
rating, including flywheels, supercapacitors or batteries, are more appropriate for the provision of 
services to distribution network operators (DNOs) and residential users. The relative importance of 
these diverse technologies in the long term will depend on the future evolution of low-carbon 
electricity systems. 
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Figure 1. Key electricity storage technology options to support the system by discharge time (seconds to hours) and system power 
rating (kW to GW) [16]. 
1.3 Structure of the study 
Reflecting the UK Government’s focus on innovation and hence the need for energy storage 
investments in the near term, this paper analyses the barriers to energy storage in the UK 
electricity market. Yet, most of the presented issues apply equally to other markets. 
Section 2 concentrates on the role of storage within the electricity system and on the issues 
deriving from the regulatory definition of energy storage. It considers the ownership and operation 
of storage by system/network operators, business models and their implications, and general 
market design issues. Current policy initiatives are then detailed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses 
our findings, while Section 5 provides our concluding remarks. 
2 Regulatory definition of energy storage 
Storage is classified as a generation asset in most electricity markets, including the UK, where 
there is neither an activity nor an asset class definition for energy storage. Generation assets have 
a very broad definition in the UK Electricity Act 1989 as “the generation of electricity at a relevant 
place”, and EU Directive 2009/72/EC similarly refers to generation as “assets that produce 
electricity”. The UK Electricity Order 2001 extends these definitions by stating that the technology 
“generates or is capable of generating electricity”. From a technical perspective, energy storage 
technologies can generate electricity, so are covered by these definitions. However, storage 
cannot generate a positive net flow of electricity, and classification as generation does not 
recognize the potential contribution of storage to moving electricity from periods of low demand to 
meet peak demands. 
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A definition of energy storage has been proposed by the European Commission as the "act of 
deferring an amount of the energy that was generated to the moment of use, either as final energy 
or converted into another energy carrier” [17]. Another definition from the UK’s Electricity Storage 
Network1 defines electricity storage as “the conversion of electrical energy into a form of energy 
which can be stored, the storing of that energy, and the subsequent reconversion of that energy 
back into electrical energy” [18], but such a definition could unintentionally include equipment such 
as network appliances. 
We propose the following definition of a storage asset that accounts for the zero (or negative) net 
flow of electricity from the device, which could better reflect the effective burden of storage on the 
system: 
“A means of converting imported electricity into a form of energy that is stored and can be 
reconverted into electrical energy, that is unable to produce a positive net flow of electrical 
energy from the device, and for which, given sufficient storage capacity headroom and 
footroom, the timing of imports and exports can, under normal operating conditions, be 
controlled independently of each other and the voltage at the point of connection to the 
power system.” 
The reference to control of the timing of imports and exports is intended to ensure that network 
assets such as capacitors and transformers are not caught by this definition. Supercapacitors have 
been identified as potentially important storage technologies for the future [19]. 
3 Network charging for energy storage 
Despite large increases in research funding for storage, and increasingly large deployments of 
variable renewable generation, many electricity markets have seen little EES deployment to date 
[20]. This may largely be attributed to the low rewards that storage operators receive for the 
services they provides to the wider network, especially in markets that have undergone significant 
restructuring and liberalization. 
Storage could provide ancillary services to the electricity networks in order to reduce peak loads, 
but this does not tend occur in some countries such as the UK. One reason is the cost of 
Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges and Distribution Use of System (DUoS) 
charges, which are designed to recoup infrastructure costs from consumers and suppliers (Table 
2). In the UK, storage providers must pay double TNUoS tariffs for their role as both generators 
and consumers, when operating in charge and discharge modes, as well as DUoS charges. If the 
generator is <100 MW, which includes most novel storage technologies, then they are not liable to 
pay TNUoS but must still pay DUoS tariffs [21]. Both transmission and distribution network tariffs 
offer potential revenue streams that could help storage realize value. The DUoS charge is banded 
by time of day, which offers an arbitrage potential for storage. The TNUoS tariff also offers 
potential revenue by reducing peak demand during the Triad periods [22].2 Whether these revenue 
streams could be realized, and storage use optimized, would depend on how storage were 
controlled and storage services sold within the electricity system. 
More generally, these double charges arguably do not reflect the complementary benefits of 
storage to the networks for balancing the wider electricity system, as the former moves electricity in 
time and the latter across space. In most cases, storage is used for balancing, which does not 
contribute to congestion but instead relieves it. The removal of barriers would ideally be based on 
                                               
1 The Electricity Storage Network (ESN) is considered by the UK Government to be the UK’s main trade body for 
electricity storage. 
2 Triads are defined as the three half-hours of highest demand on the GB electricity transmission system between 
November and February each year. National Grid identifies peak electricity demand at these three points in order to 
minimise energy consumption and set charges for transmission system use. 
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its potential contribution to the electricity system. There is a fundamental debate about the role of 
storage, in particular whether it provides an add-on service, in competition on the margin with 
networks and generation, or whether it complements networks and generation. 
EU regulations do not force member countries to regulate energy storage technologies in the same 
way. A number of member states (Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and 
Slovakia) do not impose grid fees to storage plants, while other states (Austria, Belgium and 
Greece) apply fees to storage for both charging and discharging. The lack of common EU-wide 
legislation effectively leaves each state to determine charging policies for each electricity system 
asset [23]. This regulatory heterogeneity could encourage energy storage investments in member 
states with no grid fees that then export to other member states with high grid fees. The result 
would be an inefficient and zonally sub-optimal allocation of storage resources across the EU. 
Although no EU-wide attempt has been made to harmonies grid access fees, this would provide 
fairer and more extensive competition for storage technologies and other generators across 
European electricity systems. 
Defining a new asset class for energy storage would enable the implementation of alternative 
charging regimes in those countries that treat storage as generation and apply high grid fees. One 
approach would be charging models and network connection tariffs that reflect the size, use and 
location of the storage connection [12]. However, the influence of the choice of location on the 
value of storage to the system is not well understood. 
Location Charges Charging arrangements 
Generation 
Transmission entry 
capacity (TEC) payable 
via TNUoS by 
generators and 
consumers to National 
Grid, and distribution 
use through DUoS. 
Paid at the generation TNUoS tariffs set by National Grid, which are 
charged on a maximum-capacity basis. This means that generators with 
200 MW of TEC who only generated at a maximum rate of 100 MW 
during the year would still be charged for the full 200 MW of TEC. Small 
(<100 MW in England and Wales) generators do not pay TNUoS if they 
do not significantly affect the transmission network. DUoS charges are 
payable by generators and suppliers to Distribution Network Operators 
(DNOs) for using the distribution network. 
Distribution 
DUoS paid by 
generators, suppliers, 
and major consumers 
for use of distribution 
network, to DNO.  
If DNOs suspect that the embedded generator may have a significant 
impact on the transmission network, they should contact National Grid, 
and will pay TNUoS. Distribution-connected small generators are liable to 
pay DUoS, or a charge levied by a DNO for the transmission of electricity 
through its local network, but not TNUoS. 
Consumer 
TNUoS payable by 
generators and 
consumers to National 
Grid due to charging if 
device is greater than 
100 MW. 
Different for half-hourly (HH) metered and non-half-hourly (NHH) metered 
customers. Customers with sufficiently high peak demand are obliged to 
have a HH meter. Charges for a HH metered customer are based on their 
demand during three half-hour periods of greatest demand in evenings 
between November and February, known as the Triad, and equals 
average demand during the Triad periods multiplied by the tariff for their 
zone. NHH customers are charged for the sum of their total consumption 
between 16:00 and 19:00 every day over a year, multiplied by the zonal 
tariff. 
Table 2. Regulation of UK network charges by their size and location in the electricity system. 
 
4 Ownership and operation of storage by network operators 
If networks were to invest in storage assets, then it might be possible to realize their 
complementary strengths to support the electricity system. However, the unbundling obligations in 
EU Directive 2009/72/EC, which require the separation of entities in the vertically integrated 
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system, restrict the operation and ownership of storage technologies by DNOs3 to small devices. 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are not allowed to own or operate any form of generation 
and, by extension, energy storage. There is a debate within the  European Commission about 
whether DNOs or TSOs should be allowed to own energy storage assets [24], which creates 
considerable uncertainty for new investments in storage technologies. 
There is a strategic regulatory question about the extent to which the system operator should 
directly operate energy storage. If the system operator does not control storage, it is likely that the 
imperfect information about electricity demands that is available to the storage provider would 
mean that they would be unable to sell sufficient balancing and ancillary services at the optimal 
time to realize its system value, which would make storage less competitive and would impede 
investments. The system operator is therefore best placed to optimize the use of storage 
technologies to balance the system. The scope for a choice to be made between investing in 
storage at a given location instead of extra network capacity could be widened where it can be 
shown that storage is the most economic option taking into account all the services it can offer.  
4.1 Alternative transmission network business models 
Although their choices are restricted by regulation, network companies are profit-maximizing 
businesses that are likely to view revenue-creating network capacity expansion or interconnection 
more favorably than storage investments. An Independent System Operator (ISO) could be 
created that were legally separate from owner and operator of the transmission networks. If 
regulations were introduced to ring-fence these independent operators from directly interacting with 
network operators when allocating flexibility, this might underpin investments into storage where 
appropriate. 
Three possible business models have been proposed for TSOs and these are described in Table 
3. The ‘Ownership unbundling’ and ISO models necessitate separating TSO activities from any 
activities that are related to the market. Such provision forbids the TSO from holding generation 
assets, and hence any form of energy storage. While the ITO model permits common ownership, 
which is currently prohibited, it should be accompanied by complete independence and ring 
fencing from a legal operational perspective to avoid any distortion of competition. 
Italy and Belgium similarly have more flexible approaches to TSO ownership than most countries. 
Italy allows TSOs to build and operate batteries, if this can be justified with a cost-benefit analysis 
that shows the cost-efficiency of storage compared to alternatives. Belgium similarly allows TSOs 
ownership of storage devices if this does not prevent the competitive functioning of markets [25]4. 
The key challenge for transmission network ownership of storage is to ensure competitive 
generation markets. This is a difficult challenge since the cost of storage is dominated by the 
capital cost, and once the storage asset is deployed, it is difficult to justify not using it. 
Business model Description 
Ownership unbundling 
This option requires full ownership separation in order to safeguard the independence 
of network ownership from potential interests in supply and generation. 
Independent system 
operator (ISO) 
An independent TSO free of interests in generation or supply operates the system is 
required. At the same time, ownership of the transmission network is allowed to 
remain within the transmission sector. 
Independent 
transmission operator 
(ITO) 
Ownership and operation of the asset are allowed to remain within the same sector; 
however, the ITO must be guaranteed to be operationally independent with stringent 
rules on ring fencing. 
Table 3. Proposed business models for TSOS in terms of ownership and operation of storage assets [25]. 
                                               
3 DNOs are not required to abide to these ownership unbundling regulations; rather, they have legal, accounting and 
functional unbundling requirements in order to guarantee the operational independence of distribution services from 
other activities in the system, if they serve less than 100,000 connected consumers. 
4 Italian decree law 93/11, Art. 36, par.4 16; Belgian Electricity Act, Article 9(1). 
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4.2 Alternative distribution network business models 
For DNO-owned storage in the UK, US, and other major world markets, a third party must handle 
electricity flows when storage is used to support the network or to provide broader system-wide 
services. The third party must be contracted and mentioned in the business case for the storage 
technology, which complicates the business case. This third party could be either an independent 
entity or another DNO that is appropriately ring-fenced from engaging in such activities. Such 
arrangements can be complex, leading to a barrier to entry for new storage technologies to the 
market. 
Although large-scale storage facilities are bound by generation licenses in the UK, the Electricity 
Order 2001 allows for the exemption of “small” storage with output under 50 MW [26]. Exemption 
from the standard generation license is allocated on a plant-by-plant basis, imposing potentially 
significant delays on storage-related projects [25] . 
If a DNO decided to deploy storage using the generation license exemption, it would be 
overspending its capital allowance, but would only receive little income via the restrictive de 
minimis requirements [26].5 If a DNO used a ‘standard’ approach to justify its use of storage (i.e. 
conventional asset replacement, or reinforcement), its activity would need to be assessed based 
on the expected efficient costs for the substitute asset type, which would feed into its revenue and 
the regulatory asset value. This assessment reflects a key barrier to storage deployment in that it 
fails to consider the benefits to the wider energy system, aside from those delivered to the DNO 
itself. 
Five potential business models for distribution-scale storage have been proposed and these are 
listed in Table 4. Most have been suggested by DNOs and offer them partial or full control over 
storage assets, which is prohibited by current regulations. For models involving DNOs as 
merchants and, more generally, Distribution System Operator (DSO) business models, a major 
concern is to avoid distortion of competition in generation and supply and to respect unbundling 
requirements. In models related to incentives to charge, competition issues are less important as a 
third party would be involved in both ownership and operation. However, the DNO is less likely to 
invest in storage when using this business model because the asset value to the DNO is more 
uncertain, while the DNO cannot operate the storage to realize its value. This suggests that the 
benefits to the DNO are not fully represented in this business model. Thus, while the DSO models 
have regulatory challenges, the incentives models entail far higher commercial and security risk 
[25]. There remains no consensus over which market players, including DNOs, should be given the 
ability to control storage devices [24]. 
Network ownership of energy storage has been trailed in several countries. DNOs in Italy and 
DSOs in Belgium are allowed to own and operate battery storage, and there is no evidence that 
this has prevented the competitive functioning of the generation and supply markets. Italy allows 
DNOs to control battery systems if this choice can be justified throughout a cost-benefit analysis 
showing that the storage system is the most cost-efficient way to solve the identified problem 
compared to potential substitutes such as building a new line. Belgium enables DSOs to operate 
batteries if they do not alter the competitive functioning of markets [25]. This suggests that 
restrictions on the ownership of storage by distribution-network owners could be somewhat relaxed 
in other countries, which might be sufficient to encourage the deployments required to underpin 
innovation in the near term. 
 
                                               
5 The de minimis requirements are included in the distribution licence and require that: (i) total turnover from non-
distribution businesses shall be one of 2.5% or less of total revenue of the DNOs from distribution; and, (ii) aggregate 
investments in non-distribution activities shall not be over 2.5% of the DNOs issued share capital, its consolidated 
reserves and it share premium. 
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Model Description 
DNO contracted The DNO owns and has full operational control over the storage asset. Before the 
storage asset is built, long-term contracts are agreed for the asset’s commercial control 
in certain periods of time. 
Contracted services The DNO offers long-term contracts for services at specific locations with commercial 
control in certain periods of time. 
Charging incentives The DNO sets the DUoS tariff to create signals that incentivize peak shaving to reflect 
the value of network reinforcement. 
DNO merchant The DNO owns and has full operational control over the storage asset. 
‘DSO’ role The DNO owns and has full operational control over the storage asset. In addition, the 
DNO is given a regulatory role in balancing and controlling aggregated demand and 
generation, taking on an active role as a Distribution System Operator (DSO). 
Table 4. Proposed business model specifications for DNO ownership and operation of storage assets [25]. 
5 Market design issues 
Income in wholesale electricity markets is generally determined by the marginal costs of the most 
expensive generator during each period. Most electricity systems had high reserve generation 
margins at liberalization and new investments in technologies with high capital and low operating 
costs, such as renewables, nuclear power and energy storage, have been difficult to justify without 
subsidies due to the risk of the large up-front investment not being realized [27]. Market design 
issues tend to differ between electricity systems so this section focuses on the UK markets as a 
typical case study. 
5.1 Balancing market 
The main barriers to the realization of value of storage in the balancing market are related to the 
lack of monetization of the full operational benefits that storage can provide when providing 
balancing energy through the wholesale electricity markets. The price of imbalances, known as 
cash-out prices, is unlikely to fully reflect the value that storage technologies can offer to the 
system because it is calculated in a way that only takes into account energy balancing and does 
not consider wider balancing activities. If the system operator orders the DNOs to decrease 
demand through brownouts or blackouts in order to balance the system, these balancing activities 
are not included in the method for calculating cash-out prices. 
While cash-out prices are designed to increase during periods of market tightness, they do not 
tend to increase, to a level that would make storage economic. The current market structure tends 
to dampen cash-out prices, and the signals and incentives that these are able to provide could be 
sharper if a wider set of balancing activities were included in the methodology for calculating cash-
out prices. Cash-out prices do not increase sufficiently during periods of market tightness because 
they fail to reflect the effective cost of balancing the system. This barrier decreases the value of 
flexibility and reliability of generation, and hence the potential role of storage in the balancing 
market. 
5.2 Absence of ancillary markets 
Ancillary markets could be a key source of revenue for storage [28]. The UK offers a typical 
example. Ancillary services in the UK are operated by the TSO, National Grid, who recovers the 
cost of procuring these services from generators and end-users. National Grid can issue warnings 
and rescind payments to generating units whose response is inadequate [29], and this may 
represent a drawback for energy storage providers since the discharge duration of storage 
technologies is necessarily limited to the maximum charge level [19]. In addition, updating the 
energy requirements from ancillary services so that they more accurately reflect the breadth of 
characteristics underlying storage technologies could be a key means to remove barriers to 
storage [30]. One approach would be to update ancillary service market requirements to consider 
more expensive but scalable ESS technologies that can provide system benefits at a smaller bid 
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size and shorter energy delivery duration, which would be more appropriate to energy storage 
devices. 
National Grid recently introduced week-ahead tender timescale for the frequency response service 
that aid the planning of conventional generators [31]. Additional measures to avoid medium-term 
forecast limitations, such as providing day-ahead tender timescales, and aggregation [32], might 
encourage the participation of energy storage providers in these markets, while also reducing the 
costs of providing this service. 
Until the introduction of Enhanced Frequency Response (EFR) in the second half of 2016 [33], 
there were no very fast-response balancing and ancillary markets. The introduction of EFR has 
seen a 200 MW, 4-year tender EFR grid-balancing that responds within one second of registering 
a frequency deviation, and was met extensively by batteries [34]. However, providers are 
remunerated only with a capacity payment for providing frequency response in the UK, with no 
separate payment to reflect performance accuracy of the service. This could be instrumental in 
improving the value of storage, and has already been already implemented in some US electricity 
markets [12]. There is a broad movement in the US to modify energy markets to reflect the 
increasing technical viability of energy storage, underpinned by FERC’s reduction of barriers to 
participation in ancillary services markets and structural changes that allow for pricing that is more 
sensitive to faster and more accurate frequency regulation. 
National Grid are also considering the introduction of an aggregate fast reserve service by non-
Balancing Mechanism (BM) service providers in the UK. Several storage technologies could 
comply with the standard minimum service provision of 50 MW within 2 minutes. More generally, 
an increasingly flexible market design for reserve markets would enable better allocation of storage 
capacity to the most needed or valuable service at a particular moment [35]. 
While the characteristics of storage are suited to the provision of this ancillary service, coordination 
with other services must be optimized to maximize value realization [1]. There remains a lack of 
markets in the UK to cover inertial response, governor response and transmission upgrade deferral 
or avoidance. The lack of potential markets, and the coordination of ancillary service provision, 
makes it difficult for a storage developer to consider it a benefit to provide these services. 
At high voltage levels and under the responsibility of the system operator, trading mechanisms 
such as contracts for ancillary and balancing services provide opportunities for an economically 
efficient supply of system flexibility services. In a future in which smart metering and real-time 
management of distribution networks were present, similar arrangements could be implemented for 
medium- and low-voltage levels. These services and policy incentives are unlikely to succeed 
unless they are subject to explicit efficiency, equity, simplicity, consistency, transparency, stability 
and additivity requirements [36]. 
5.3 Capacity market 
Increasing deployment of weather-dependent renewables has led to the introduction of new 
electricity markets to ensure security of supply, principally through the introduction of capacity 
markets. Western Australia, which is not connected to the rest of the country’s grid, has 
implemented a capacity mechanism, but prices are often very high [37], which may be interpreted 
by some as a failure of the capacity mechanism. In the UK, the first capacity auction took place in 
December 2015 for the provision of capacity in winter 2018/19. Germany has not implemented a 
large-scale capacity mechanism on the grounds that it is expensive and inefficient, rather relying 
on the power market. 
The UK’s Electricity Market Reform (EMR) introduced a capacity market to improve the security of 
the UK electricity supply. The T-4 capacity market auction was held to secure capacity between 
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2020 and 2035, with storage securing 500 MW out of a total commitment of 3.2 GW (so only 15% 
of the total capacity) [34]. 
One challenge for storage providers is that they can only participate directly in the capacity market 
if their capacity is at least 2 MW, unless they bids into the market alongside other generators 
through an ‘aggregation’ service [38]. 
When storage devices are awarded a capacity contract, they must commit to deliver a certain 
amount of electricity during periods of system stress. There is no time limit over which this delivery 
must be maintained, thus capacity can be requested at any time during the contracted period. 
Such an ‘open-ended’ obligation is a key issue for most storage providers since their discharge 
duration is necessarily limited to the maximum charge. The storage device must remain fully 
charged for a long period and suffer parasitic energy losses. If the storage device were entirely 
discharged before the end of the warning period6, its provider would be subject to a heavy penalty7 
[25]. An alternative approach of establishing contracts for defined time limits might provide more 
secure revenue streams to storage providers and improve their integration within the system. 
5.4 Climate Change Levy 
Some legislation can unexpectedly affect the competitiveness of storage technologies. The Climate 
Change Levy (CCL) in the UK is a good example. This tax is imposed on energy delivered to non-
domestic users with the aim of incentivizing energy efficiency investments and reduced carbon 
emissions. 
The treatment of storage under the UK Climate Change Levy (CCL) remains unclear. Electricity 
generated from renewable resources8 receives a Levy Exempt Certificate (LEC) [26]. The CCL is 
calculated at the point where electricity is delivered from generation to a distribution or 
transmission system. However, if export of electricity from a storage device relies on the import of 
electricity (from a LEC-owning generator) and then the export of this electricity, the issuing of a 
new LEC at the point of export (since storage is considered a generator) implies a double LEC. 
Therefore, it could be argued that storage should not be eligible for LECs, which currently 
represent a substantial barrier to the optimal deployment of storage resources. In a fair market, 
storage would be treated equally to other generation resources, and the treatment of storage under 
the CCL arguably does not reflect the value of storage in supporting renewable integration to 
decarbonize the system. 
6 Categorization of barriers to energy storage deployment 
The major barriers to investment in new energy storage technologies, based on the discussion in 
the previous sections and on several EU-focused studies [23, 39-41], are in order of perceived 
importance: 
1. a lack of any form of direct support for storage, or lack of clear investment incentives; 
2. the classification of storage as a generator although it does not produce a positive net flow 
of electricity, resulting in unfavorable circumstances, including the presence of open-ended 
                                               
6 A warning period is issued in the capacity market at least four hours before an anticipated event of system stress, 
which is designed to give capacity providers a period of four hours in which to supply capacity. 
7 While it is possible to limit the provider’s exposure to penalties if the provider offered less than its full capacity to the 
market, a practice known as ‘de-rating’, this practice is unlikely to overcome these barriers. Moreover, a storage provider 
could participate in secondary trading to lower the penalty risk by buying the delivery obligation from another provider, 
but this is unlikely to reflect the efficient value of storage since it is an expensive method due to the fact that the period in 
which this may occur is most often a tight market period. Relying on the secondary market is unlikely to represent an 
efficient solution to decrease non-delivery risk. 
8 In the CCL framework, renewable sources of electricity are defined as those not derived from fossil fuels or nuclear, 
and include waste only if the fossil fuel content is less than 10% of the total. 
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contracts for delivery of electricity at any time during long periods in the Capacity Market, 
via open-ended capacity contracts, which cannot practically be met by storage; and, 
3. double and/or uncertain fees for grid access; 
4. a lack of recognition of system-wide benefits from storage, including ancillary service 
performance accuracy payments, such as within the frequency response service, and the 
absence of non-energy and wider balancing activities in the calculation of cash-out prices in 
the balancing market. 
5. uncertainty regarding the ownership of storage assets; 
6. uncertainty regarding the operation of storage assets; 
7. a lack of ultrafast-response balancing and ancillary markets; 
8. an incomplete, uncertain and complex licensing process; 
9. the absence of verified needs for storage declared from an official government source; 
10. the absence of verified roles for storage declared from an official government source, 
including advice on business models and regulatory viability of these, for each domain; 
11. the absence of unified and conclusive EU and national legal and regulatory frameworks, 
and regulatory differences between national markets; 
12. Distortions in national energy markets; 
13. the lack of policy/regulatory reflection of the substantial dependency of storage on wider 
electricity system developments; 
14. the absence of cost-effectiveness and efficiency of transmission energy planning as 
storage also depends on the evolution of the network;  
15. competition with other balancing and ancillary assets; 
16. uncertain public attitudes towards storage (Pidgeon et al., 2014); 
These barriers lead to cost allocation issues, distorted compensation mechanisms, lack of price 
signals and bureaucratic issues and delays [12]. 
We have identified four barriers to energy storage in EU markets that underpin the investment 
barriers: (i) classification; (ii) differences in market rules between adjacent balancing and ancillary 
markets; (iii) lack of ancillary service markets; and, (iv) public sentiment. 
Figure 2 shows the links between the four underpinning barriers and the investment barriers. The 
lack of a separate classification of storage assets contributes to the greatest number of barriers. 
The investment barriers are interdependent, which at first sight could make effective policymaking 
more difficult. Yet addressing the four underpinning barriers could contribute to overcoming a 
number of investment barriers. 
Public attitudes are a potentially important factor that may determine whether storage is widely 
accepted in the UK economy. The engagement of people with energy technologies, both from the 
demand and supply sides, is a key and sometimes neglected issue that could affect investment. 
People may find different in-house or large-scale technologies more or less desirable to integrate 
in their lifestyles or society [42]. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between barriers to energy storage deployment. Exogenous barriers are colored red. 
The barriers to large-scale integration of photovoltaics in the electricity distribution grids are closely 
related to those affecting storage. A recent paper [43] categorizes options for integrating distributed 
photovoltaics into three areas: (i) Distribution System Operator (DSO) solutions; (ii) prosumer 
solutions; and, (iii) interactive solutions [44]. DSO solutions can be deployed by current DNOs 
because they do not require interaction with prosumers, and typically involve reinforcing the 
network, and deploying or operating equipment in the distribution networks. Interactive solutions 
require the cooperation of DNOs and prosumers, and usually require a communication 
infrastructure to enable the interaction of both parties. Finally, prosumer solutions involve the 
deployment and/or operation of devices installed at the premises of prosumers to modify, for 
example, their power injection without the direct intervention of DNOs. The authors conclude that 
current regulation does not promote the evolution of DNOs to DSOs, or an increase in smart grid 
investments, since DNOs are in many cases not allowed to have extensive control over modern 
onsite energy technologies, and that there are missing frameworks enabling DNOs to access 
advanced technology features such as PV inverter capabilities, which could be useful for voltage 
control or selective curtailment. In addition, current retail tariffs and price signals so not fully reflect 
the needs of the local distribution network. 
Multiple market drivers suggest that electrical energy storage (EES) systems are going to be 
essential for future power systems within the next decade, but deployment and regulatory change 
in European markets is progressing at a slower pace compared to the Californian market. With 
reference to the market and regulatory frameworks in California and Europe, a recent paper [45] 
identifies key barriers to EES, particularly emphasising the inadequate market design that benefits 
traditional technologies, and the lack of need for EES in some jurisdiction in Europe.  
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7 Discussion 
Energy storage is classified as a generation asset in most liberalized electricity markets. Yet, 
storage technologies cannot generate new electricity and they must rely on generators to gain 
revenue from providing a host of energy market services. Classification is the most significant 
exogenous barrier to the deployment of storage resources in electricity markets. We therefore 
proposed a new definition for electrical energy storage that may contribute to recognizing the 
potential of storage in shifting electricity in time and that differentiates it from generation with the 
aim of facilitating the removal of numerous barriers to deployment. 
There is a precedent in the gas markets for creating a unique asset definition for storage. Security 
of supply and system stability is a primary concern not only for gas storage in the gas market, but 
for electricity as well. While this has concentrated on research capacity margins for generators in 
the past, a more encompassing approach that considered energy storage, interconnection, 
demand-side response, network reinforcement and flexible generation would be more suitable to 
reflect the evolving UK electricity market and would help to reduce the costs of ensuring supply 
security in the future. The regulatory definition of storage in the electricity system is quite different 
to that of gas storage in the natural gas market, which is treated as an independent asset [46]. Yet, 
experience from the gas market suggests that creating such a definition could be insufficient to 
meet the goal of realizing the value of storage and other complementary technologies to minimize 
electricity supply costs [23]. 
The principal issue derived from classifying storage as generation is the imposition of double 
transmission and distribution network tariffs, which reduce its competitiveness. As storage can 
increase or reduce network congestion, depending on the network design and the storage location 
relative to generation and demand, these network charges could be justified in some 
circumstances but are unlikely to be justifiable in a well-designed system. 
Technology choice and scale will depend on whether the electricity system moves towards 
‘European-wide energy superhighways’ or instead toward a system of increasing local energy 
autonomy, featured also by widespread demand side management, which would likely 
substantially reduce the need for centralized storage solutions [47]. 
The case for policy support for storage has divided opinion among stakeholders. Some believe that 
storage deployment constitutes a ‘special case’ in need of policy support, whilst others insist that 
markets can provide the necessary platform to negotiate contracts, which reward storage operators 
for the range of services they could provide [48]. 
7.1 Network operator ownership of storage assets 
Storage may need to queue for a long time behind generation for a connection to the grid even if it 
can relieve constraints. Valuation issues can be addressed through a more transparent pricing of 
energy-system services and provision of price signals and control technologies to end users [49]. 
There is currently a lack of policies that could enable DNOs to transparently demonstrate that other 
customers in the queue can benefit from storage connecting to the grid by allowing for quicker and 
cheaper connections through an avoided need for reinforcement. In such cases, DNOs should 
promote storage. Yet enticing DNOs to promote storage may be a difficult task because, in the 
absence of these incentives, DNOs may simply see storage as an alternative to network expansion 
that may reduce their own profitability. Incentives could be provided in the form of heat maps to 
offer providers useful information about demands throughout the network, which might also 
incentivize deployment of storage in optimal locations in distribution networks. It remains unclear 
how network connections will be priced in the future to reflect the unique characteristics of 
electricity storage. Depending on the generation portfolio, location and choice of storage 
technology, it could support the electricity system by meeting peak loads, reducing peak network 
flows and hence managing network constraints. One approach for the Government to consider 
 17 
 
would be charging models and network connection tariffs that reflect the size, use and location of 
the storage connection [12]. 
7.2 New markets for energy storage 
Energy storage is unable to compete with flexible generation in existing UK electricity markets. 
Establishing new markets that reward storage for their non-energy benefits9 to the system, or the 
ultra-fast responding characteristics that some storage technologies can provide, would open up a 
market. Proposed market changes such as the provision of enhanced frequency response and 
aggregate fast reserve services could provide new opportunities for storage. Realizing the potential 
value of storage to the balancing market has proven difficult, and even the new Capacity Market 
has features such as an effectively open-ended delivery obligation that affects the viability of 
storage in the market. Energy storage technologies could make these important contributions if 
effective innovation, underpinned by deployment into electricity markets, can reduce their high 
capital costs. The scale of cost savings from adopting storage technologies to the UK derive from 
avoided fossil fuel costs, a better utilization of generation and network assets and a superior 
performance in providing network services. By these means, the impact of storage has been 
demonstrated to potentially very large, reaching up to an order of multiple £bns/year with additional 
savings of comparable orders are to be achieved if storage is deployed early [11]. Accelerated 
innovation is required to reduce these costs, which involves deploying technology into electricity 
systems in order to “learn-by-doing”. 
Emerging energy storage technologies would benefit from a friendlier market environment. Energy 
storage is an important part of the UK’s industrial policy and the UK is at the forefront of developing 
a number of novel energy storage technologies with high export potential. However, the required 
innovation is unlikely to happen unless a regulatory path is created to facilitate the deployment of 
energy storage in the existing electricity system. 
The barriers for active deployment of energy storage through electric vehicles is discussed in [50] 
from technology, infrastructure, regulatory and market perspectives.  Regulatory and policy barriers 
are thought to present a greater challenge than technology and infrastructure issues due to the 
large diversity of distribution systems and respective regulatory frameworks across markets. 
7.3 Subsidies for energy storage deployment 
Although novel storage technologies have recently taken a small role in several countries, for 
example in ancillary markets in the UK, it is currently difficult to justify deploying storage as both 
network reinforcement and flexible generation are currently cheaper for most system and electricity 
market requirements. Low-carbon electricity generators with high capital costs have required 
subsidies to compete, in the form of generation quotas or strike prices, and energy storage 
technologies face similar challenges. 
Storage in the UK is not supported by specific subsidies to support its deployment, which could 
represent a barrier per se, decreasing investor confidence. Experience from other technologies, 
e.g. solar PV and wind, suggests that growth of a market for a technology can reduce costs, and 
incentives can play an important part in creating that market.  
The California market has been modified to encourage the deployment of novel energy storage 
technologies. California enacted a law in October 2010 requiring the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) to establish appropriate 2015 and 2020 energy storage procurement targets 
for California load serving entities, on condition that they were cost-effective and commercially 
viable by October 2013. Furthermore, specific storage targets were set by the CPUC for each 
electric utility and type of domain (i.e. transmission; distribution; end-user) [12], which has led to an 
unprecedented rate of deployment of storage across the market. These initiatives are expected to 
                                               
9 Non-energy benefits are benefits beyond energy savings, such as the integration of renewables or avoided emissions. 
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decrease the risk that electric utilities face when investing in energy storage [51]. China and 
France have recently also implemented a similar obligation. 
In addition, storage may be subject to tariff-based barriers, such as the fact that utilities typically 
cannot offer a rate structure for high-quality uninterruptible power to those companies that need 
such security, yet they can offer interruptible tariffs to those who are willing to have their power 
supply curtailed in times of shortage [52]. 
7.4 Limitations to this analysis and future work 
This study identifies a range of market barriers to deploying electrical energy storage. There is a 
need to estimate empirically the extent of the market failures and inefficiencies due to these 
barriers. Applying a whole electricity system modelling approach that incorporated a policy module 
could contribute toward explaining these inefficiencies and applying a regulatory policy module that 
empirically took into account these barriers would help to better understand and reduce the 
influence of these barriers on the incentives for storage deployment. More generally, we 
recommend that market authorities identify the relationships between barriers, in order to enable a 
deeper and smoother removal of barriers to deployment, in the spirit of the analysis provided in this 
paper. 
8 Conclusions 
Although energy storage is recognized as a key technology, current regulations could prevent 
storage from developing into an optimally performing flexibility option for electricity markets. Our 
work identified and qualitatively analyzed the major regulatory barriers that could constrain the 
system-optimal deployment of storage resources in the UK, the majority of which apply to most 
liberalized electricity markets across the globe.  
A key challenge is the treatment of storage technologies as generation subsets, which creates 
numerous uncertainties. We argue that this issue leads to additional regulatory barriers, and show 
that resolving this issue would facilitate the removal of numerous barriers to deployment. These 
barriers notably lead to cost allocation issues, distorted compensation mechanisms, lack of price 
signals and bureaucratic issues and delays.  
We defined the ‘exogenous’ barriers to energy storage, or barriers that are unaffected by other 
barriers, which are identified as: regulatory classification, differences in market rules between 
adjacent balancing and ancillary markets, and a lack of system and non-energy ancillary service 
markets. These barriers are shown to cause multiple additional barriers and are interdependent, 
which makes sensible policymaking difficult by nature. 
While storage has only very recently began securing contracts for the Enhanced Frequency 
Response (EFR) service and the Capacity Market, major regulatory and market design barriers are 
preventing storage from realizing their full value throughout the electricity system. The extent of 
deployment will depend on the development of independent system operators that are able to 
allocate grid services efficiently to non-conventional resources. While such an activity necessitates 
substantial control of these assets by the system operator, it will likely require new market 
mechanisms that incentivize these resources to participate more freely in markets for grid services. 
Various initiatives are currently underway and may help address the current difficulty of storage 
resources in accessing key revenue streams. While market changes such as the EFR frequency 
response and aggregate fast reserve services could provide important revenue for storage, 
additional efforts will be required. In particular, further research is needed to understand the ways 
in which system and non-energy benefits could be realized, inter-temporally dispatched and 
managed. Policies such as flexible connection agreements [53] could represent the first step 
toward monetizing these less conventional benefits. Additional policies will also be required to 
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minimize the distortion of value to storage from aggregation services, which will in turn depend on 
the degree of market centralization. 
The removal of barriers to storage is directly associated with its treatment as an integral part of the 
electricity system. In such a setting, system efficiency will be maximized if market players are 
incentivized to view the technology as complementing networks and generation assets, rather than 
competing with them on the margin. 
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